

**Page Denied**

S E C R E T

## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #3400-83  
9 May 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : David Y. McManis  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT : NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: April

1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
2. Comments on warning situation.

a. USSR

(1) Andropov has deepened the Soviet commitment to respond firmly to INF deployment next winter. In his speech at a dinner in honor of East German party chief Honecker on 4 May, Andropov warned that a "chain reaction is inevitable" and that the USSR, East Germany, and the other Warsaw Pact states "will be compelled to adopt response measures." His offer to negotiate an INF accord based on equality of both warheads and delivery vehicles "in Europe" was aimed at encouraging West European governments, especially West Germany, to press for a delay in INF deployment. If these tactics are unsuccessful, however, the Soviets will have to proceed with threatened countermeasures or risk having their warnings exposed as bluff.

(2) Honecker's cancellation of his visit to Bonn next fall was in part an attempt to influence politics and policy in the CDU-FDP coalition, but it may also have been related to Soviet Bloc plans for responding to INF deployment. East Germany's threat on 26 April to curtail West German access to West Berlin raises the possibility that Bloc reactions will include restrictions on or harassment of

S E C R E T


25X1

S E C R E T

Western access to both West and East Berlin. The fact that the East Germans were willing to invoke even an indirect warning of a new Berlin crisis underscores Moscow's resolve to defeat INF deployment or at least to respond with forceful measures to counter the strengthening of the U.S. political and strategic position in Europe and to defend the Soviet Union's insistence on "equality and equal security" in the East-West nuclear balance.

b. Middle East


(1)



25X6

Assad's tactics may include demands for security arrangements in eastern Lebanon similar to the Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon. He may also attempt to establish linkage between a withdrawal agreement and Israeli and U.S. commitments to broader negotiations that would include Syria's demand for recovering the Golan Heights.

(2) A prolonged stalemate over Syrian conditions for withdrawing will increase the potential for clashes between Israeli forces and Syrian-supported Palestinian groups in Lebanon.



25X6


(3)



25X1  
25X1

Jordanian moves to limit immigration into the East Bank could also stimulate serious unrest among West Bankers.

25X1



25X6

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

25X6

c. Central America

(1) The Sandinistas are attempting to exploit the Contadora group's mediation initiative to focus international attention on the US and Honduran relationship with the Nicaraguan Democratic Force and to influence the Central American dialogue toward calling for a cessation of foreign support for and withdrawal of Nicaraguan insurgent forces. Foreign Minister D'Escoto's protest over alleged U.S. and Honduran support for a "new aggression", claiming that 1,000 Honduran troops are supporting insurgent attacks inside Nicaragua, illustrates the Sandinistas' calculation that Contadora mediation can be manipulated to intimidate Honduras and to place the U.S. on the defensive.

(2) The Nicaraguans are also building a case to justify cross-border military operations against insurgent bases in Honduras. They probably believe they can capitalize on traditional Latin American emphasis on non-intervention to defend limited military reprisals and to force Honduras to withdraw support from the insurgents.

(3) If Sandinista political tactics appear to be succeeding, the Cubans may adopt a higher profile in supporting Nicaragua, including the dispatch of more military advisers and perhaps even direct Cuban participation in Sandinista military operations against the insurgents. In the event that developments in the next few months seem to place the US and Honduras on the defensive, Castro would be tempted to make demonstrative displays of political and military support in order to claim credit for having protected the Nicaraguan revolution from U.S. attempts to overthrow it.

d. Southern Africa

(1) The South Africans are preparing for another major offensive in southern Angola and they are establishing a justification by alleging a buildup of Angolan, SWAPO, and

S E C R E T


S E C R E T

Cuban forces. South African claims that a large Angolan force with Cuban tanks is moving to recapture UNITA-held positions in eastern Angola are also intended to justify a major incursion and greater support for reported UNITA plans to conduct an offensive near Luanda before the end of May.

(2) Coordinated South African and UNITA offensives would heighten the likelihood of a clash with Angolan and Cuban forces. The Soviets could be expected to focus international attention on such an encounter and to exploit the opportunity to increase their military assistance to Angola.



David Y. McManis



25X1

S E C R E T

**Page Denied**